中國(guó)網(wǎng)站品牌欄目（頻道）
We are also working though the World Trade Organization to address continuing challenges to fair competition. Take government procurement. The purchases that governments make represent an important part of the global economy, and citizens everywhere deserve to know that their governments are getting the best product at the best prices. Consistent with the WTO Government Procurement Agreement that we signed, America lets companies from other nations who have signed that same agreement compete for appropriate American Government contracts. We would naturally expect countries that want access to our government contracts to offer our companies genuine access to theirs in return.
我們還正通過世界貿(mào)易組織來努力解決公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)不斷面臨的問題。例如政府采購問題。政府所進(jìn)行的采購代表著全球經(jīng)濟(jì)的重要部分，任何地區(qū)的公民均有權(quán)知道政府是在以最好的價(jià)格購買最佳產(chǎn)品。根據(jù)我們簽署的世界貿(mào)易組織《政府采購協(xié)議》,美國(guó)允許其他簽署了同樣協(xié)議的國(guó)家的公司競(jìng)爭(zhēng)適宜的美國(guó)政府合同。我們當(dāng)然希望那些想獲得我國(guó)政府合同機(jī)會(huì)的國(guó)家也真誠(chéng)地為我們的公司提供競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)方政府合同的機(jī)會(huì)。
Across the full spectrum of international institutions—the G8 and G20, the IMF, OECD, ILO, WTO, and others—we are working to level playing fields and encourage robust and fair economic activity. Just as the WTO eliminated harmful tariffs in the 1990s, today we need institutions capable of providing solutions to new challenges, from some activities of state-owned enterprises to the kinds of barriers emerging behind borders.
我們還通過各種國(guó)際機(jī)構(gòu)組織——如8國(guó)集團(tuán)、20國(guó)集團(tuán)、國(guó)際貨幣基金組織、經(jīng)合組織、國(guó)際勞工組織、世貿(mào)組織等——來努力實(shí)現(xiàn)平等的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境，鼓勵(lì)健全而公平的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)。正如上世紀(jì)90年代世貿(mào)組織廢除了有害的關(guān)稅，今天我們需要有一些機(jī)構(gòu)來提供辦法，解決從國(guó)有企業(yè)的某些活動(dòng)到境內(nèi)出現(xiàn)壁壘等新問題。
We also support innovative partnerships that develop norms and rules to address these new concerns. We should build on the model of the Santiago Principles on sovereign wealth funds, which were negotiated jointly by host governments, recipient governments, the World Bank, IMF, OECD, and the sovereign funds themselves. This code of conduct governing sovereign investment practices has reassured stakeholders — investor nations, recipient nations, and the private sector. And it may prove a useful model for other shared challenges, like ensuring that state-owned companies and enterprises compete on the same terms as private companies.
我們支持有創(chuàng)意的合作關(guān)系，針對(duì)這些新問題制定標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和規(guī)則。我們應(yīng)借鑒有關(guān)主權(quán)財(cái)富基金的《圣地亞哥原則》模式，這些原則是由東道國(guó)政府、接受國(guó)政府、世界銀行、國(guó)際貨幣基金組織、經(jīng)合組織以及主權(quán)基金等共同談判而成。管理主權(quán)投資活動(dòng)的行為準(zhǔn)則消除了利益相關(guān)方——如投資國(guó)、接受國(guó)、以及私營(yíng)公司——的疑慮。這對(duì)于解決其他共同的問題或許是一個(gè)有用的模式，如確保國(guó)有公司和企業(yè)與民間公司按照同樣的規(guī)則進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。
As a second step, we are pursuing new cutting-edge trade deals that raise the standards for fair competition even as they open new markets. For instance, the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS, will eliminate tariffs on 95 percent of US consumer and industrial exports within five years. Its tariff reductions alone could increase exports of American goods by more than $10 billion and help South Korea's economy grow by 6 percent. So, whether you are an American manufacturer of machinery or a Korean chemicals exporter, this deal lowers the barriers to reaching new customers.
第二個(gè)步驟是，我們將謀求一種新型的貿(mào)易協(xié)定，使它們?cè)陂_拓新市場(chǎng)同時(shí)，提升公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。例如,《韓國(guó)與美國(guó)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》,即KORUS，將在5年時(shí)間內(nèi)取消美國(guó) 95%的消費(fèi)品和工業(yè)出口產(chǎn)品關(guān)稅。僅消除關(guān)稅就能為美國(guó)出口產(chǎn)品帶來100億美元以上的增長(zhǎng)，并促使韓國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)6%。所以，無論是美國(guó)機(jī)械制造商，還是韓國(guó)化學(xué)品出口商，這一協(xié)定均為獲得新客戶減少了障礙。
But this trade deal isn't simply about who pays what tariff at our borders. It is a deeper commitment to creating conditions that let both our nations prosper as our companies compete fairly. KORUS includes significant improvements on intellectual property, fair labor practices, environmental protection and regulatory due process.
然而，這項(xiàng)貿(mào)易協(xié)定并非只涉及誰在我們的邊界支付多少關(guān)稅的問題。它是更深一層的承諾，即創(chuàng)造條件，讓兩國(guó)在彼此公司的公平競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中走向繁榮。《韓國(guó)與美國(guó)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》涵蓋了在知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)、公正對(duì)待勞工、環(huán)保及正當(dāng)監(jiān)管程序上的明顯改進(jìn)。
And let me add that the benefits of KORUS extend beyond the economic bottom line. Because this agreement represents a powerful strategic bet. It signals that America and South Korea are partners for the long term—economically, diplomatically, people to people. So, for all these reasons, President Obama is pursuing congressional approval of KORUS, together with necessary Trade Adjustment Assistance, as soon as possible. He is also pursuing passage of the Colombia and Panamanian Free Trade Agreements as well.
讓我補(bǔ)充一點(diǎn)——該協(xié)定的好處不限于經(jīng)濟(jì)底線。它意味著有力的戰(zhàn)略性抉擇。它標(biāo)志著，美國(guó)與韓國(guó)在經(jīng)濟(jì)、外交和民間交流領(lǐng)域是長(zhǎng)期合作伙伴。因此，奧巴馬總統(tǒng)正在謀求國(guó)會(huì)盡快批準(zhǔn)《韓國(guó)與美國(guó)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》,以及必要的“貿(mào)易調(diào)整援助”計(jì)劃。他也在謀求批準(zhǔn)與哥倫比亞和與巴拿馬的自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定。
Now, we have learned that, in our system, getting trade deals right is challenging, painstaking work. But it's essential. We consider KORUS a model agreement. Asian nations have signed over 100 bilateral trade deals in less than a decade, but many of those agreements fall short on key protections for businesses, workers, and consumers. There are a lot of bells and whistles, but many of the hard questions are glossed over or avoided.
我們認(rèn)識(shí)到，在我們的體制內(nèi)，達(dá)成適中的貿(mào)易協(xié)定要通過艱難和痛苦的努力。但它十分重要。我們認(rèn)為《韓國(guó)與美國(guó)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)定》是一個(gè)典范協(xié)定。在過去不到10年時(shí)間內(nèi)，亞洲國(guó)家簽署了100多項(xiàng)雙邊貿(mào)易協(xié)議，但許多這類協(xié)議未能為商家、工人和消費(fèi)者提供關(guān)鍵性的保護(hù)。它們?cè)谛问缴蠎?yīng)有盡有，但忽視或規(guī)避了許多艱難的問題。
Beyond that, there is now a danger of creating a hodgepodge of inconsistent and partial bilateral agreements which may lower tariffs, but which also create new inefficiencies and dizzying complexities. A small electronics shop, for example, in the Philippines might import alarm clocks from China under one free trade agreement, calculators from Malaysia under another, and so on—each with its own obscure rules and mountains of paperwork—until it no longer even makes sense to take advantage of the trade agreements at all. Instead, we should aim for true regional integration.
除此之外，現(xiàn)在還存在著另一種危險(xiǎn)性，即五花八門、缺乏一致性和完整性的雙邊協(xié)議。這些協(xié)議可能降低一些關(guān)稅，同時(shí)卻會(huì)導(dǎo)致新的低效率與令人眼花繚亂的復(fù)雜規(guī)定。例如，在菲律賓的一家小型電子產(chǎn)品商店有可能根據(jù)一項(xiàng)自由貿(mào)易協(xié)議從中國(guó)進(jìn)口鬧鐘，但根據(jù)另一項(xiàng)協(xié)議從馬來西亞進(jìn)口計(jì)算器，以此類推——每一項(xiàng)協(xié)議都有其晦澀難懂的規(guī)則并需要準(zhǔn)備堆積如山的文件——直至這些貿(mào)易協(xié)議變得毫無意義，其所能提供的益處不復(fù)存在。我們的努力方向應(yīng)當(dāng)與之相反，即真正實(shí)現(xiàn)地區(qū)一體化。
That is the spirit behind the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the so-called TPP, which we hope to outline by the time of APEC in November, because this agreement will bring together economies from across the Pacific—developed and developing alike—into a single trading community.
這就是跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系——簡(jiǎn)稱“TPP”——倡導(dǎo)的精神。我們希望在今年11月亞太經(jīng)合組織開會(huì)時(shí)概述它的內(nèi)容，因?yàn)檫@項(xiàng)協(xié)議將匯集整個(gè)太平洋地區(qū)的各經(jīng)濟(jì)體——無論是發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家還是發(fā)展中國(guó)家——使之成為一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的貿(mào)易體。
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