In recent decades, failure to sustain economic progress has been blamed on a supposed middle-income country (MIC) trap. Such blaming obscures as much as it supposedly explains.

近幾十年來，無法維持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)常常被歸咎為所謂的"中等收入國(guó)家陷阱"。這種說辭與其說是解釋，不如說是掩飾。

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The ‘middle-income trap’ fable began as a World Bank story about why upper MICs in Latin America failed to become high-income countries (HICs) after pursuing policies required or prescribed by the Bretton Woods institutions.

“中等收入陷阱說”源自世界銀行的一個(gè)故事。這個(gè)故事講述了為什么拉丁美洲的第一梯隊(duì)中等收入國(guó)家在遵循了布雷頓森林體系下屬機(jī)構(gòu)要求或指定的政策后還是未能成為高收入國(guó)家。

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Bretton Woods’ Frankenstein

布雷頓森林體系被創(chuàng)立者毀滅

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The 1944 Bretton Woods rules-based international monetary system ended in August 1971 when President Richard Nixon unilaterally repudiated US obligations. This happened after the US Treasury had borrowed heavily from the rest of the world from the 1960s.

1971年8月，尼克松總統(tǒng)單方面拒絕履行美方義務(wù)，從而導(dǎo)致基于1944年布雷頓森林協(xié)定的國(guó)際貨幣體系瓦解。此前，從20世紀(jì)60年代起，美國(guó)財(cái)政部就大舉向世界其他國(guó)家借債。

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The US government’s ‘exorbitant privilege’ of ‘spending well beyond its means’ has continued despite the resulting international monetary ‘non-system’. Continuing acceptance of the US dollar, or ‘greenback’, as the virtual world currency has enabled its Treasury to borrow internationally at low cost.

盡管直接導(dǎo)致國(guó)際貨幣體系瓦解，美國(guó)政府卻繼續(xù)保留著“超前消費(fèi)”的“特權(quán)地位”。全球持續(xù)接受美元作為虛擬的世界貨幣，讓美國(guó)財(cái)政部可以低成本向世界各國(guó)借款。

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This has enabled the US to maintain massive trade and current account deficits, and a military presence in much of the world, despite its huge, but still growing fiscal and trade deficits. The US exorbitant privilege seems to have been sustained by its ‘soft power’ and unassailable military superiority.

盡管美國(guó)的財(cái)政和貿(mào)易赤字巨大且不斷增長(zhǎng)，美國(guó)來自各國(guó)的借款讓其可以維持海量貿(mào)易額和經(jīng)常賬戶赤字，以及在全球很多地區(qū)的軍事存在。美國(guó)的特權(quán)地位似乎一直由其“軟實(shí)力”和不容置疑的軍事優(yōu)勢(shì)維持著。

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Facing ‘stagflation’ – economic stagnation with inflation – US Fed chair Paul Volcker raised interest rates sharply from 1980. This soon killed US inflation, but also Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ legacy from the 1930s.

由于面臨停滯性通貨膨脹（經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯和通貨膨脹并存），時(shí)任美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)主席保羅·沃爾克從1980年開始大幅上調(diào)利率。這很快就遏制住了美國(guó)的通貨膨脹，但也讓20世紀(jì)30年代羅斯福新政的遺產(chǎn)蕩然無存。

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With inflation high, real interest rates seemed low despite high nominal interest rates in the developing world. With growth high in the global South in the 1970s, borrowing to sustain investments, even from abroad, remained attractive.

在高通脹下，發(fā)展中國(guó)家的名義利率很高但實(shí)際利率卻似乎很低。20世紀(jì)70年代，對(duì)正在高速發(fā)展的南半球國(guó)家而言，借款甚至舉外債來維持投資仍然很有吸引力。

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But US interest rate hikes soon triggered fiscal and sovereign debt crises in many countries: Poland in 1981 was followed by various Latin American, African and other developing economies.

但是美國(guó)的大幅加息卻引發(fā)了許多國(guó)家的財(cái)政和主權(quán)債務(wù)危機(jī)：先是波蘭在1981年暴發(fā)危機(jī)，然后是拉美、非洲等其他發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

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Washington Consensus

華盛頓共識(shí)

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Facing rising interest rates, many governments could no longer service accumulated debt, let alone borrow to invest more. Instead, they had to pursue contractionary monetary and fiscal policies domestically, causing economic stagnation.

面臨利率上漲，多國(guó)政府無力償還累積債務(wù)，更別提繼續(xù)借款來投資。因此，他們只能在國(guó)內(nèi)采用緊縮的貨幣和財(cái)政政策，從而導(dǎo)致經(jīng)濟(jì)停滯。

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With Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan demanding such macroeconomic policies, the Washington-based Bretton Woods institutions soon prescribed them, ending the post-Second World War Keynesian ‘Golden Age’.

當(dāng)時(shí)，英國(guó)首相撒切爾夫人和美國(guó)總統(tǒng)里根想推行宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，華盛頓的布雷頓森林體系下屬機(jī)構(gòu)就迅速制定新規(guī)，從此終結(jié)了二戰(zhàn)后凱恩斯主義的“黃金年代”。

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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded contractionary stabilisation policies to qualify for short-term credit facilities. World Bank structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) typically required economic liberalisation and privatisation for longer-term financing.

國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）敦促各國(guó)緊縮財(cái)政穩(wěn)定經(jīng)濟(jì)，以滿足短期信貸服務(wù)的條件。世界銀行結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整計(jì)劃（SAPs）通常要求滿足經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化和私有化條件才能提供長(zhǎng)期信貸服務(wù)。

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The Bank also advocated more export-orientation and foreign investment. When paid by Japan’s government, the Bank celebrated its post-war industrial boom as a ‘miracle’, a new model for emulation. But this soon ended with its demise due to the US-demanded overvalued yen and its ill-advised financial ‘Big Bang’.

世界銀行還提倡各國(guó)發(fā)展出口導(dǎo)向型經(jīng)濟(jì)，吸引外資。在收到日本政府的還款后，世界銀行盛贊日本戰(zhàn)后的工業(yè)繁榮是一個(gè)“奇跡”，是各國(guó)效法的新榜樣。但由于日元在美國(guó)的要求下大幅升值加上不明智的金融“大爆炸”導(dǎo)致日本經(jīng)濟(jì)崩盤，這一盛景也迅速終結(jié)。

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Latin American conundrum

拉丁美洲的謎題

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Latin American and other vulnerable economies lost over a decade from the 1980s while African economies lost a quarter century. Low-interest official Japanese credit initially mainly went to Southeast Asia, while South Asia took on less foreign debt.

自20世紀(jì)80年代以來，拉丁美洲和其他脆弱的經(jīng)濟(jì)體的發(fā)展停滯了超十年之久，而非洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體則停滯了四分之一個(gè)世紀(jì)。日本低息貸款一開始主要流向了東南亞，南亞國(guó)家借的外債則較少。

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Stabilisation and SAP conditionalities undermined Latin America’s modest industrialisation, which also prevented the region from recovering strongly until the new century. But their economies had not been sufficiently liberalised for ‘neoliberals’ despite turning more to foreign trade and investment from the 1980s.

要求經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定的條件和結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整貸款的條件損害了拉丁美洲的適度工業(yè)化進(jìn)程，也阻止了該地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)在新世紀(jì)前強(qiáng)勢(shì)復(fù)蘇。盡管拉丁美洲從20世紀(jì)80年代起更多地轉(zhuǎn)向外貿(mào)和外資，但是由于“新自由主義”思潮，拉美經(jīng)濟(jì)體一直沒有實(shí)現(xiàn)充分的自由化。

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Prosperous economies became more protectionist, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. But developing countries were told to open up even more despite shrinking export markets.

與此同時(shí)，發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體開始采用更多的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義政策，尤其在2008年全球金融危機(jī)之后。但是發(fā)展中國(guó)家卻被告知要進(jìn)一步對(duì)外開放，盡管他們的出口市場(chǎng)不斷萎縮。

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But with globalisation over, even East Asia can no longer rely on export growth. Also, it is difficult to turn away from export-oriented production, especially as earlier trade deal commitments cannot be unilaterally repudiated.

隨著全球化走向終結(jié)，甚至連東亞國(guó)家也不能再依賴出口來實(shí)現(xiàn)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。但是，要放棄出口導(dǎo)向性生產(chǎn)也很困難，尤其在早期的貿(mào)易協(xié)定不能單方面違約的情況下。

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In many prosperous economies, workers captured some of their productivity gains. But the oft-heard claim that productivity increases lag behind wage rises usually serves employers. In most ‘labour-surplus’ developing countries, wages remain low.

在許多發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體，工人可以獲得部分生產(chǎn)力收益。但是人們常常聽到的生產(chǎn)率增長(zhǎng)落后于工資增長(zhǎng)的聲音往往是為雇主服務(wù)的。在大多數(shù)“勞動(dòng)力富余”的發(fā)展中國(guó)家，工資依然維持在較低水平。

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As in South America early this century, progressive redistribution has often accelerated, rather than subverted growth. Common claims that such redistribution is bad for growth must be critically reconsidered. After all, progressive redistribution sustained growth in post-war Europe.

而在本世紀(jì)初的南美地區(qū)，進(jìn)步的再分配機(jī)制往往加快而不是阻止了經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。必須批判性地看待那些認(rèn)為這種再分配有損經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的普遍說法。畢竟，正是這種進(jìn)步的再分配機(jī)制讓戰(zhàn)后的歐洲保持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。

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Breaking out of the trap

逃離陷阱

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The ‘middle-income trap’ argument claims MICs cannot sustain rapid economic progress. Supposed reasons vary with policy and ideological biases, as ostensible structural, cultural, political, behavioural or governance causes typically reflect such prejudices.

“中等收入陷阱”一說認(rèn)為中等收入國(guó)家無法維持高速的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。其理由因政策和意識(shí)形態(tài)的偏見有所不同，所謂的結(jié)構(gòu)、文化、政治、行為或治理方面的理由通常都能反映出這樣的偏見。

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Recent narratives have proclaimed the need to ‘graduate’ from secondary to tertiary economic activities. Modern services growth is supposedly needed to sustain progress to become HICs.

最近有理論聲稱有必要從第二第三產(chǎn)業(yè)“畢業(yè)”了，現(xiàn)在必須發(fā)展現(xiàn)代服務(wù)業(yè)才能維持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)從而成為高收入國(guó)家。

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Another popular argument has been that progressive redistribution has subverted growth. But it is now uncontroversial that progressive redistribution was crucial for sustaining growth in post-war Europe.

另一個(gè)流行的理論是進(jìn)步的再分配機(jī)制阻礙了經(jīng)濟(jì)的增長(zhǎng)。但是現(xiàn)在毋庸置疑的是，進(jìn)步的再分配機(jī)制對(duì)于戰(zhàn)后歐洲保持經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)至關(guān)重要。

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Discretionary state powers have undoubtedly been abused for political patronage and self-aggrandisement. Clientelism plagues many societies, undermining needed state interventions. But we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater.

毫無疑問，國(guó)家自由裁量權(quán)以政治任命和自我擴(kuò)張的形式被濫用。庇護(hù)主義在許多社會(huì)肆虐，削弱了必要的政府干預(yù)。但我們不應(yīng)良莠不分一起舍棄。

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History suggests the best way to overcome the ‘middle income trap’ would be to implement appropriate investment and technology policies. Selective policies are needed to promote growth, not only of manufacturing, but also of high-end services, as well as safe, nutritious and affordable food supplies.

歷史表明，克服“中等收入陷阱”的最好方式應(yīng)該是實(shí)施適當(dāng)?shù)耐顿Y和技術(shù)政策。需要選擇性地采取政策來促進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展，不只是制造業(yè)和高端服務(wù)業(yè)的發(fā)展，還有安全、有營(yíng)養(yǎng)、價(jià)格實(shí)惠的農(nóng)產(chǎn)品行業(yè)的發(fā)展。

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But all this is not going to happen spontaneously. Reforms need to be deliberately elaborated and sequenced through various interventions as part of well-designed, coherent and sustained initiatives.

但所有這些不會(huì)自行發(fā)生。我們需要精心策劃，通過各種干預(yù)措施來有序推進(jìn)改革，并保證方案的周密性、連貫性和持續(xù)性。

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作者：佐摩（Jomo Kwame Sundaram），馬來西亞知名經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)者

翻譯&編輯：丹妮