美國(guó)時(shí)間10月4日，美國(guó)副總統(tǒng)彭斯在哈德遜研究所就美國(guó)對(duì)華政策發(fā)表了長(zhǎng)達(dá)一個(gè)小時(shí)的演講。美國(guó)方面在一周前就已經(jīng)為此次演講做了預(yù)告，聲稱演講將為特朗普政府的對(duì)華政策定調(diào)。中國(guó)方面擔(dān)心演講會(huì)給已經(jīng)高度敏感的中美關(guān)系增加負(fù)面情緒，甚至讓國(guó)際社會(huì)認(rèn)為中美之間的“新冷戰(zhàn)”已經(jīng)不可避免。從彭斯演講的內(nèi)容來(lái)看，這次演講更多出于美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)政治目的，有意將中國(guó)作為特朗普民意支持下降的替罪羊。
On October 4, United States Vice President Mike Pence delivered a one-hour speech on the US' China policy at the Hudson Institute. The US government announced that the speech would be given a week ago, claiming that it would set the tone of the Trump administration's China policy. The Chinese government is concerned that the speech merely adds more negative sentiment to the already sensitive relationship between China and the US and that it suggests to the international community that a new Cold War between the two countries is inevitable. Judging from its content, Pence's speech served more of a domestic political purpose, as it sought to use China as a scapegoat for US President Donald Trump's falling public approval.

演講匯集了近年來(lái)美國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)對(duì)于中國(guó)的不滿、猜疑和誤解，給中美關(guān)系留下了更多的困惑。如何理解這些困惑很可能將決定著中美關(guān)系的未來(lái)。
The speech touched on US feelings of dissatisfaction, suspicion, and misunderstanding toward China in recent years, creating yet more confusion around China-US relations.

第一個(gè)困惑是演講沒(méi)有說(shuō)明特朗普政府對(duì)華政策的根本邏輯。演講以“特朗普對(duì)華政策”為題，但是演講的絕大部分內(nèi)容與中美之間的互動(dòng)無(wú)關(guān)，而是關(guān)于所謂的中國(guó)干涉美國(guó)內(nèi)政問(wèn)題。相對(duì)于兩國(guó)在經(jīng)貿(mào)和軍事領(lǐng)域的諸多問(wèn)題，“中國(guó)干涉美國(guó)內(nèi)政問(wèn)題”只是一個(gè)新近出現(xiàn)的、仍具爭(zhēng)議的話題，在中美關(guān)系中所占的分量很小。這種問(wèn)題如同中美兩國(guó)之間出現(xiàn)的若干突發(fā)性危機(jī)一樣，不足以決定中美關(guān)系的基本價(jià)值取向。演講沒(méi)有解決美國(guó)對(duì)華政策的根本性問(wèn)題，即美國(guó)如何與中國(guó)建立一個(gè)可持續(xù)、對(duì)美國(guó)和世界和平有利的關(guān)系。彭斯在演講中稱，希望與中國(guó)建立建設(shè)性關(guān)系。如果說(shuō)這種關(guān)系是以美國(guó)通過(guò)貿(mào)易、外交、軍事等領(lǐng)域施壓來(lái)“改造”中國(guó)為基本手段，那么這顯然并不是建設(shè)性關(guān)系。這種做法只會(huì)加劇兩國(guó)之間的對(duì)立和敵意，最終演變?yōu)椴豢赡孓D(zhuǎn)的螺旋。
The speech did not explain the logic behind the Trump administration's China policy. The speech was on Trump's policy toward China, but most of its content was unrelated to the interactions between the two countries. Rather, it was about China's so-called interference in US internal affairs. China's interference in US internal affairs is a new and still controversial topic, and it plays only a small part in China-US relations. Like the sudden crisis that has arisen between the two nations, this issue does not characterize their relationship.The speech failed to address the fundamental problem with the US' China policy, which is how the US can establish a relationship with China that is sustainable as well as favorable to the US and the rest of the world. Pence did say in his speech that he hopes to establish a constructive relationship with China. It will obviously not be constructive, though, if it consists of the US attempting to reform China through trade, diplomacy, and military pressure. Such an approach will only exacerbate the confrontation and hostility between the two countries and create an irreversible downward spiral.

第二個(gè)困惑是演講并沒(méi)有證實(shí)中國(guó)如何干預(yù)美國(guó)內(nèi)政。彭斯在演講中提出了很多所謂中國(guó)干涉美國(guó)內(nèi)政的證據(jù)，例如中國(guó)國(guó)際廣播電臺(tái)在美國(guó)30多個(gè)電臺(tái)播放對(duì)中國(guó)友好的節(jié)目；在美中國(guó)留學(xué)生建有聯(lián)合會(huì)；中國(guó)試圖分化美國(guó)商界、地方政府與聯(lián)邦政府在中美經(jīng)貿(mào)摩擦上的團(tuán)結(jié)等等。但是，彭斯所列舉事例帶有明顯的政治偏見(jiàn)。運(yùn)用商業(yè)渠道在他國(guó)投放有利于本國(guó)國(guó)家形象的宣傳片是一種國(guó)際慣例，屬于軟實(shí)力宣傳的范疇，美國(guó)同樣試圖用“美國(guó)之音”等媒體對(duì)華宣傳。在美中國(guó)留學(xué)生的結(jié)社自由應(yīng)當(dāng)?shù)玫矫绹?guó)法律的保護(hù)和美國(guó)政府的接受。而美國(guó)商界、地方政府與中國(guó)各級(jí)政府的互動(dòng)，多數(shù)并非是由中方主動(dòng)發(fā)起，而源于美國(guó)地方政府對(duì)特朗普極端貿(mào)易政策的憂慮。美國(guó)的聯(lián)邦制和選舉制度給了地方政府和各種利益集團(tuán)充分表達(dá)其訴求的權(quán)利，這種權(quán)利是美國(guó)之所以成為美國(guó)的基石。
The speech also did not specify how China has interfered in US internal affairs. Pence cited a lot of supposed evidence of China's interference, for example China Radio International broadcasting Beijing-friendly programming on over 30 US radio stations, the presence of Chinese Students and Scholars Associations set up by Chinese students in the US, and attempts by China to exploit divisions between businesses and federal- and local-level governments on issues like trade to advance its political influence. But the examples cited by Pence reflect obvious political bias. The use of commercial channels to promote one's own country is an international normal practice. The US, for example, uses Voice of America and other forms of media to conduct propaganda in China. The right of Chinese students to freedom of association in the US should be protected by US law and accepted by the US government. And many of the interactions between US businesses and local government and the Chinese government at various levels are not initiated by people in China but are the result of the concerns of local governments in the US over Trump's extreme trade policies. Ultimately, the US federal and electoral system give local governments and various interest groups the right to fully express their desires. This right is a cornerstone of US political life.

第三個(gè)困惑是演講讓特朗普政府的對(duì)華表述更加令人費(fèi)解。彭斯的演講延續(xù)了特朗普總統(tǒng)在對(duì)華表述上的一貫矛盾：特朗普既希望與中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人建立良好友誼，又毫無(wú)忌憚地批駁中國(guó)的對(duì)外戰(zhàn)略，將中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會(huì)政策描繪為可怕的陰謀。特朗普既不愿意看到中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)遭殃，又把讓中國(guó)股市大幅下跌、中國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)投資者損失慘重作為其貿(mào)易政策有效的證據(jù)。這些相互矛盾的表述損害了美國(guó)政府在中國(guó)的信譽(yù)，使中國(guó)難以確信與美國(guó)的談判能夠得到長(zhǎng)期有效的結(jié)果。
The speech obfuscated the Trump administration's stance on China. Pence's speech perpetuated Trump's consistently contradictory approach to dealings with China: on the one hand, he wants to build a close friendship with China's leader， but, on the other, he has no qualms about criticizing China's foreign policies and portraying China's domestic economic and social policies as appalling conspiracies. Trump ignores the economic downturn in China but considers the sharp fall in Chinese stock markets and the heavy losses suffered by Chinese investors as evidence of the effectiveness of his trade policy. His contradictory statements have undermined the credibility of the US government in China, making it difficult to believe that negotiations with the US can yield long-term results.

第四個(gè)困惑是演講提出了一個(gè)雙重的公平、對(duì)等和尊重標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。彭斯認(rèn)為，中美關(guān)系重新回到以合作為主的渠道需要雙方以公平、對(duì)等和尊重重建信任。但是，從彭斯的表述來(lái)看，這種所謂的公平、對(duì)等和尊重標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是以中國(guó)在各方面的無(wú)條件讓步為前提。美國(guó)可以隨意挑戰(zhàn)中國(guó)在南海的海洋權(quán)益，卻不準(zhǔn)中國(guó)擁有自衛(wèi)能力；美國(guó)可以增加對(duì)臺(tái)灣的軍事援助，干涉中國(guó)內(nèi)政問(wèn)題，卻不允許中國(guó)在美國(guó)投放商業(yè)廣告宣傳本國(guó)形象；美國(guó)可以在印太地區(qū)推出大規(guī)?；C(jī)會(huì)，卻不允許中國(guó)繼續(xù)推動(dòng)其“一帶一路”倡議。這種雙重標(biāo)準(zhǔn)源于美國(guó)的優(yōu)越感和“美國(guó)例外論”，這與公平、對(duì)等和尊重的精神是矛盾的。彭斯希望中國(guó)把美國(guó)視為“他同我們也一樣”，但他所提出的要求卻表明美國(guó)希望中國(guó)把美國(guó)稱為“圣上”。
Pence suggested that for China-US relations to return to a state of cooperation, the two sides' relationship must be grounded in fairness, reciprocity, and respect. But it seems from what Pence said this means China making unconditional concessions. The US is allowed to challenge China's maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, but China is not allowed to have self-defense capabilities. The US is allowed to step-up its military assistance to Taiwan and thus interfere in China's internal affairs, but China is not allowed to run commercial advertisements in the US to promote itself. The US is allowed to launch large-scale infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific, but China is not allowed to continue promoting its Belt and Road Initiative. Such double standards stem from US feelings of superiority and the ideology of American exceptionalism, which are in stark contradiction to the spirit of fairness, reciprocity, and fairness touted by its leaders. Pence said that he hopes China will treat the US as an equal, but his demands suggest that the US wants China to treat it as an emperor.

第五個(gè)困惑是演講沒(méi)有給出美國(guó)對(duì)華政策的清晰前景。彭斯稱美國(guó)向中國(guó)伸出了手，希望與中國(guó)共同迎接未來(lái)。但是，彭斯的演講并沒(méi)有解決中美競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的一些關(guān)鍵性問(wèn)題。例如，中美關(guān)系的下限在哪里？中美之間是否需要遵守一些共同規(guī)則？中美是否應(yīng)當(dāng)共同避免陷入某種形式的“新冷戰(zhàn)”？中美之間如何在當(dāng)前形勢(shì)下相向而行？美國(guó)希望通過(guò)怎樣的機(jī)制來(lái)解決中美關(guān)系中的新問(wèn)題？等等。
The speech did not present a clear vision of the US's policy toward China. Pence said that America is reaching out its hand to China and that it hopes China will reach back in the future. But his speech did not address the key issue of China-US competition. For example, what is the lower limit of China-US relations? Should the US and China adhere to a set of common rules? Should China and the US try to avoid falling into some form of new Cold War? How can China and the US move in the same direction? What sort of mechanism does the US hope to use to solve new problems in China-US relations?

這些困惑表明彭斯講話并沒(méi)有給特朗普對(duì)華政策畫下句點(diǎn)，沒(méi)有標(biāo)志著美國(guó)對(duì)華新共識(shí)的形成，沒(méi)有預(yù)示著中美新冷戰(zhàn)必然發(fā)生。如何看待、處理這些困惑給中美關(guān)系的未來(lái)帶來(lái)了機(jī)遇和挑戰(zhàn)。
These omissions show that Pence's speech did not help to clarify Trump's China policy; it did not mark the creation of a new US consensus on China and it did not indicate that a new Cold War between the US and China is inevitable. Dealing with these areas of confusion presents both opportunities and challenges for future China-US relations.

在積極方面，這些困惑意味著美國(guó)對(duì)華政策的良好期望并沒(méi)有完全消失。彭斯所提出的問(wèn)題不少是中美關(guān)系中的長(zhǎng)期性問(wèn)題，另一些則是由于政治、意識(shí)形態(tài)因素帶來(lái)的新誤解。中美雙方仍然有可能通過(guò)澄清誤解、在利益沖突問(wèn)題上展開務(wù)實(shí)對(duì)話來(lái)解決大部分問(wèn)題，并且將一些難以短期內(nèi)解決的問(wèn)題留給將來(lái)。這種將問(wèn)題分解、逐一溝通、分階段解決的方式是1972年以來(lái)兩國(guó)形成的較為成熟的模式。在解決問(wèn)題的過(guò)程中，雙方也有機(jī)會(huì)通過(guò)溝通尋找共同利益和創(chuàng)造新的合作機(jī)遇。中國(guó)官方對(duì)于彭斯講話的回應(yīng)已表明，中國(guó)沒(méi)有放棄與美國(guó)建立建設(shè)性關(guān)系，不希望讓當(dāng)前中美關(guān)系的緊張局面放任自流。
On the upside, this means that the US has not abandoned its positive expectations for its China policy. Many of the issues raised by Pence are long-standing issues in China-US relations. Some others are misunderstandings due to political and ideological factors. It is still possible for China and the US to resolve most of these problems by dispelling misunderstandings and engaging in pragmatic dialogue on conflicts of interest, while leaving some issues that are difficult to resolve in the short term for future discussions. This way of breaking down problems, discussing them one-by-one, and solving them in stages is a relatively mature model used by the two countries since 1972. In the process of communicating to solve such issues, both parties can also discover common interests and create new opportunities for cooperation. China's official response to Pence's speech has shown that China has not abandoned its constructive relationship with the US and does not want to let the current tensions in China-US relations get out of hand.

在消極方面，這些困惑意味著美國(guó)方面仍然有可能采取更單邊的措施來(lái)表明美國(guó)對(duì)華政策的有效性。由于美國(guó)缺乏通過(guò)中美良性互動(dòng)的方式解決中美關(guān)系諸多問(wèn)題的意愿，美國(guó)更可能采取一些突發(fā)性、可以持續(xù)升級(jí)的措施來(lái)逼迫中國(guó)讓步。這種政策不僅將像“中美貿(mào)易摩擦”一樣給兩國(guó)關(guān)系帶來(lái)超預(yù)期的消極影響，也可能給世界和平及美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)帶來(lái)反作用。除了少部分對(duì)華有深刻偏見(jiàn)的人士，沒(méi)有人希望中美完全決裂和走向全面對(duì)抗。這種結(jié)果也將標(biāo)志著特朗普“良性大國(guó)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)”世界觀的失敗。
On the downside, these areas of confusion mean that the US is likely to take more unilateral measures to demonstrate the effectiveness of its China policy. Because the US lacks the will to solve many issues in China-US relations through positive engagement with China, it is more likely to adopt sudden and constantly escalating measures to force China into making concessions. This approach will not only have unexpected negative consequences for bilateral relations, as is the case with the current trade tensions, but may also have counter-productive outcomes for world peace and the US economy. Except for a small minority of people who hold deep prejudices against China, nobody wishes to see a complete breakdown in China-US relations and a move toward full-on confrontation. Such an outcome would mean the failure of Trump's worldview of “great power competition.”

（來(lái)源：中美聚焦網(wǎng)，編輯：Helen）