世界正在經(jīng)歷百年未有之大變革，這已成為全球的共識(shí)。然而，不同的國(guó)家、不同的學(xué)派有著不同的認(rèn)知和解讀。總體看，戰(zhàn)后確立的世界秩序已經(jīng)很難甚至不能應(yīng)對(duì)頻頻出現(xiàn)的各種世界性、時(shí)代性新挑戰(zhàn)。這些挑戰(zhàn)主要表現(xiàn)為：大國(guó)地緣政治強(qiáng)勢(shì)回歸，圍饒權(quán)力中心較量空前激烈，敵友、伙伴、對(duì)手關(guān)系定位更趨復(fù)雜；經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題強(qiáng)烈政治化，保護(hù)主義、孤立主義、為所欲為的霸權(quán)主義橫行，嚴(yán)重沖擊有利于經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的基于規(guī)則的既有秩序；西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家聯(lián)手對(duì)其他國(guó)家進(jìn)行技術(shù)封鎖，占領(lǐng)和牢牢掌握第四次產(chǎn)業(yè)革命的核心技術(shù)，緊握未來(lái)發(fā)展權(quán)。

The world is undergoing a once-in-a-century transformation. This is recognized worldwide; however, different countries and different schools of thought hold different perspectives. In general terms, the post-Second World War order is struggling to cope with some global contemporary challenges, including the following: greater strength among the great powers again and an uniquely ferocious contest focused on centers of power, wherein determining friends, partners, and opponents is extremely complex; economic issues are strongly politicized and protectionism, isolationism, and the desire for hegemonism are rampant, which seriously impact the existing rule-based order designed to promote economic growth; the US and other developed Western countries have teamed up to impose technology blockades on other countries so that they can dominate the core technologies of the fourth industrial revolution and maintain future development rights.

在世界大變革的背景下，中美關(guān)系同步發(fā)生著新的具有相當(dāng)深度的變化和相應(yīng)的政策調(diào)整。

Against the backdrop of these major global changes, China-US relations have undergone new profound changes and corresponding policy adjustments.

一是美國(guó)的對(duì)華戰(zhàn)略定位發(fā)生明顯的重大變化，從“不確定”轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)椤皯?zhàn)略競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者"，黨派、政府、軍界、智庫(kù)等形成共識(shí)，認(rèn)為中國(guó)有能力有意愿挑戰(zhàn)美國(guó)的霸權(quán)地位，美國(guó)應(yīng)該丟掉幻想，采取多種方式制衡中國(guó)。在調(diào)整對(duì)華政策的方向上，政治精英們扮演著先鋒作用，強(qiáng)硬派漸成主流，溫和派噤若寒蟬。他們認(rèn)為，只要敲打中國(guó)，美國(guó)必勝?！靶悴湃骸薄ⅰ吧虡I(yè)圈”和“武夫幫群”的匯聚支撐起了特朗普例外政策的獨(dú)特風(fēng)景線。

First, the US has significantly adjusted its strategic positioning vis-à-vis China, from uncertainty to strategic competition, with US political parties, the government, the military and think tanks forming the opinion that China poses a challenge to US hegemony and that America needs to get real and adopt measures to counter China. Policy elites in the US have played a leading role in adjusting their country's approach to China. Hardliners have gradually become the mainstream, while moderates have been left out in the cold. The hardliners believe that as long as they keep China down, the US will prevail. US academics, businesspeople, and military personnel all support Trump's unique vision of American exceptionalism.

二是經(jīng)貿(mào)碰撞將成中美關(guān)系緊張的新常態(tài)，更成為特朗普政府對(duì)華強(qiáng)硬政策的重要組成部分。在這樣的形勢(shì)下，“貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)”和“變臉戲法”成了中美關(guān)系中的關(guān)鍵詞。當(dāng)中美第二輪貿(mào)易磋商達(dá)成“停止”貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)共識(shí)后，美國(guó)內(nèi)部支持和反對(duì)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的聲音均批評(píng)特朗普“輸了”，姆努欽財(cái)長(zhǎng)更公開(kāi)聲稱，總統(tǒng)根據(jù)中國(guó)的履約情況“可以隨時(shí)決定恢復(fù)關(guān)稅”。貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的大棒時(shí)刻高懸，從雙邊到多邊，從貿(mào)易到投資，領(lǐng)域與范疇擴(kuò)大。美方或聲稱要重談中國(guó)入世條件和市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)地位，或以“國(guó)家安全”為由，審查中國(guó)赴美投資，阻遏、削弱經(jīng)貿(mào)在中美關(guān)系中的壓艙石作用。不難看出，貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)只是中美關(guān)系緊張的前戲，“中國(guó)制造2025”才是美國(guó)的重要目標(biāo)。

Second, economic and trade friction have become the new norm in China-US relations, as well as an important part of the Trump administration's tough stance on China. “Trade war” and “flip-flop” are the buzzwords of this new state of affairs. After the second round of trade consultations between China and the US averted a trade war, both American supporters and detractors of a trade war with China criticized Trump for backing down. United States Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin publicly claimed that Trump could choose to introduce tariffs at any time. The threat of a trade war loomed large as it escalated from bilateral to multilateral, from trade to investment, and across ever more products and industries. Threats have also been made to renegotiate the terms of China's accession to the WTO and its status as a market economy, or even review China's investments in the US on the grounds of national security. All of this has undermined the vital role economics and trade play in China-US relations. It is clear that a trade war is only the forerunner to tensions in China-US relations; Made in China 2025 is the US's major objective.

三是美方堅(jiān)持“一中”政策沒(méi)有變，這是美方在各種中美關(guān)系對(duì)話中說(shuō)得很順口的一句話，然而一個(gè)時(shí)期以來(lái)，美國(guó)更多強(qiáng)調(diào)中國(guó)大陸一方首先破壞了臺(tái)?，F(xiàn)狀，以此掩蓋它更積極主動(dòng)全面強(qiáng)化美臺(tái)關(guān)系的言行，以增強(qiáng)臺(tái)灣牽制和抵抗大陸的能力?！?018財(cái)年國(guó)防授權(quán)法案》具有分水嶺意義，它不僅涉及美臺(tái)軍艦互訪內(nèi)容，還要求國(guó)防部在收到臺(tái)灣方面軍售請(qǐng)求半年之內(nèi)向國(guó)會(huì)提交答復(fù)建議報(bào)告。這無(wú)異于把對(duì)臺(tái)軍售作為一項(xiàng)強(qiáng)制性法規(guī)固化，預(yù)示美國(guó)的對(duì)臺(tái)政策朝著官方化方向向前邁出了一步。緊隨其后的《臺(tái)灣旅行法》出臺(tái)，更為美國(guó)官方赴臺(tái)出席各類活動(dòng)埋下伏筆。美國(guó)還在國(guó)際舞臺(tái)上為臺(tái)灣撐腰，拉攏日本、澳大利亞等盟友支持臺(tái)灣，甚至炒作商簽美臺(tái)自貿(mào)協(xié)定，把臺(tái)灣列入其印太戰(zhàn)略的一枚棋子。美國(guó)激活“不沉航母”制約中國(guó)的動(dòng)向令人深思，它不僅在南海借航行自由侵犯中國(guó)主權(quán)，還叫嚷要穿越臺(tái)灣海峽，挑戰(zhàn)中國(guó)核心利益。這說(shuō)明美國(guó)在以更具進(jìn)攻性的方式與中國(guó)進(jìn)行戰(zhàn)略博弈。

Third, the US insists its one-China policy has not changed. This is something the US has paid lip-service to during various dialogues on China-US relations. Nevertheless, for some time now, the US has claimed that the Chinese mainland was the first to upset the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. This is an attempt to conceal US ambitions to strengthen US-Taiwan relations to make Taiwan better able to resist and contain the mainland. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 was a watershed document. It not only allows ports of call by the US navy in Taiwan and for US Pacific Command to receive ports of call by Taiwan, it also requires the Pentagon to submit a report of recommendation to Congress within six months of receiving an arms sale request from Taiwan. This is tantamount to making arms sales to Taiwan a compulsory regulation and indicates that the US's Taiwan policy is becoming more official. Moreover, shortly after the Taiwan Travel Act was adopted, US officials travelled to Taiwan to attend various functions. The US has also supported Taiwan on the international stage and rallied allies including Australia and Japan to the cause. The US has even suggested that a US-Taiwan free trade agreement could be signed and that Taiwan could be included in the US's Indo-Pacific Strategy. The US is intent on having an unsinkable aircraft carrier to restrict China's movements. It is not only seeking to violate China's sovereignty by insisting on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, but also dreams of crossing the Taiwan Straits to challenge China's core interests. The US is adopting an offensive approach in its strategic game with China.

中美力量對(duì)比達(dá)到關(guān)鍵節(jié)點(diǎn)，這是美國(guó)對(duì)華政策調(diào)整的深層原因。一般情況下，崛起國(guó)GDP達(dá)到霸權(quán)國(guó)的60%，是后者的容忍極限，兩國(guó)容易發(fā)生沖突。上世紀(jì)70年代的蘇聯(lián)、80年代的日本均是在這個(gè)節(jié)點(diǎn)上遭到美國(guó)的打擊，現(xiàn)在輪到中國(guó)了。美國(guó)精英階層等不少人對(duì)中國(guó)的認(rèn)知和心理發(fā)生了根本性變化，公開(kāi)認(rèn)為對(duì)華“接觸”政策失敗，懷疑中國(guó)“前所未有地靠近世界舞臺(tái)中心”意在取代美國(guó)成為新的世界領(lǐng)袖。焦慮也好，憂患意識(shí)也罷，美國(guó)對(duì)華示強(qiáng)漸成跨黨派共識(shí)。看來(lái)，美國(guó)政治精英普遍認(rèn)為，“中華民族偉大復(fù)興”與“讓美國(guó)再偉大”的兩國(guó)戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)之間存在根本沖突，矛盾難以調(diào)和。中美關(guān)系的結(jié)構(gòu)性和制度性差異，會(huì)不時(shí)地置中美關(guān)系于如履薄冰的境地。

Rising Chinese power is an underlying reason for the US's change in policy. Historically, the GDP of an upcoming country has been allowed to reach 60% of that of the hegemonic power before the latter takes action. Both the Soviet Union in the 1970s and Japan in the 1980s were brought down a peg or two by the US upon reaching that milestone. Now it is China's turn. Many people in the US elite have fundamentally changed their views and thinking on China. They openly believe that the policy of engagement with China has failed and that China is closer to the center of the world stage than ever before and wishes to replace the US as a new world leader. A bipartisan consensus has been forged out of the sense of urgency this has engendered. It seems that the US political elite believes that there is a fundamental conflict between the two countries' strategic goals of rejuvenating the Chinese nation and making America great again, with contradictions that are difficult to reconcile. Structural and institutional differences between China and the US are bound to put China-US relations on shaky ground from time to time.

不過(guò)，美國(guó)對(duì)華政策尚未最后確定，中美關(guān)系挑戰(zhàn)中仍蘊(yùn)藏著無(wú)限機(jī)遇，機(jī)遇大于挑戰(zhàn)，合作多于分歧。特朗普喜歡攪亂天下而讓美國(guó)獲利，但他仍有某種限度，美方似乎還未最終做與華對(duì)決的準(zhǔn)備。中國(guó)8萬(wàn)億美元的巨大市場(chǎng)，美國(guó)內(nèi)部的理性溫和聲音，使利益集團(tuán)不會(huì)放棄合作的主張。越來(lái)越多的青年人，在信息高度自由流動(dòng)的今天，不致被假新聞、偽與論所蒙騙，他們對(duì)中國(guó)的好感度超過(guò)50%，他們才是中美關(guān)系的未來(lái)。中美關(guān)系經(jīng)過(guò)40多年的接觸、碰撞、管控、合作，形成了相當(dāng)程度的你中有我、我中有你的融和局面，使中美關(guān)系產(chǎn)生了一定程度的不以人的意志為轉(zhuǎn)移的內(nèi)生聚力，打破這種自然規(guī)律必將兩敗俱傷。兩國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的引領(lǐng)作用成為中美關(guān)系發(fā)展的穩(wěn)定之錨，這在當(dāng)今時(shí)代難能可貴。

The US' China policy is not finalized. There are infinite opportunities within the challenges that frame China-US relations. Opportunities outweigh challenges, and there is more common ground than differences. Trump loves to create chaos for the benefit of the US, but even he has a limit, and it seems unlikely that the US is prepared to go toe-to-toe with China. It is likely that rational and moderate voices in the US as well as interest groups will not want to give up access to China's huge $8 trillion-market. In this era of free-flowing information, fewer young people are deceived by fake news and fabricated public opinion. More than half of them have been shown to have positive feelings towards China. They are the future of China-US relations.The contact, confrontation, control, and cooperation that has characterized China-US relations over the past four decades has created a considerable degree of integration between our two countries as well as a certain degree of endogenous convergence not engendered by human will. Messing with this natural law will undoubtedly hurt both parties. The leadership abilities of the heads of state have become the anchor of stability in China-US relations and have proved valuable in the current era.

在這個(gè)大變革的時(shí)代，中美關(guān)系更顯得是一對(duì)不可或缺的伙伴關(guān)系，對(duì)兩國(guó)對(duì)全球都是如此。管控分歧是漫漫旅途中的家常便飯，合作共贏是雙方的不二選擇。世界秩序的積極演化將由中美關(guān)系的健康發(fā)展引導(dǎo)。新型國(guó)際關(guān)系、人類命運(yùn)共同體或?qū)⒊蔀橹忻狸P(guān)系新時(shí)代的歷史性貢獻(xiàn)。要達(dá)到這一最高目標(biāo)，中美兩國(guó)需要相互適應(yīng)，需要提高境界，需要?jiǎng)?chuàng)新發(fā)展思維和路徑。

In this time of great change, China-US relations constitute an indispensable partnership for both parties and the rest of the world. Managing differences is commonplace on long journeys, and cooperation and mutual benefit should be pursued by both sides. The positive evolution of world order depends on healthy China-US relations. Under the new type of international relations, China's policy of a global community with a shared future could be a historic contribution to the new era of China-US relations. To achieve this ultimate goal, China and the US need to understand each other better, clearly define their boundaries, and come up with new ways of thinking and acting.

對(duì)手乎？伙伴乎？今天的緊張未必是明天的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。雙方均處在對(duì)方戰(zhàn)略棋譜上的首要位置，這應(yīng)該是中美關(guān)系最大的新變化。

Adversaries or partners? Today's tensions do not need to turn into tomorrow's war. Both sides are the focus of each other's strategies. This is the biggest recent change in China-US relations.

作者：陳永龍，中國(guó)國(guó)際問(wèn)題研究基金會(huì)美國(guó)研究中心主任

（來(lái)源：中美聚焦網(wǎng)，編輯：Helen）